Tag: France

  • Conservative Ideology Politics & Principles

    The previous article focused on militant conservatism. But it didn’t go into detail on various types of conservatism, or on the characteristics of conventional conservatism. Nor did it explain how the character of conservatism varies from one nation to another. 21st century progressives are in the process of developing an international outlook, so awareness of ideological and organizational differences is crucial. The concept of conservatism is central to these differences. This article is a review of conservative ideology, politics and principles.

    Summary of the Discussion So Far

    To summarize the discussion so far, after the end of World War II, social scientists in the United States feared militant anti-communism and its negative influence on the civil rights movement and other campaigns. They believed anti-communist and anti-liberal ideas threatened peace and democracy. Many thinkers in the field of International Relations (IR) tried to create a stronger liberalism as part of their strategy. They believed they could accomplish this by borrowing conservative ‘insights’. The fusion of liberalism and the radical Right was called ‘realism’. Another name for realism is conservative liberalism. Postwar American International Relations developed in this context.

    Considering this history, it is not surprising that conventional conservatism has faded into the background. Or maybe it would be more correct to say that conventional conservatism turned into realistic liberalism in the context of International Relations. The same thing happened to liberalism.

    Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. and Reinhold Niebuhr

    Thinkers such as Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. and Reinhold Niebuhr began to reformulate liberalism in a way that muted the radical, progressivist, egalitarian and utopian premises of the Progressive Era, and to talk about ‘original sin’, the inherent irrationality of human nature, and the limitations of political solutions to intractable problems of the human condition.1 At the same time, they denied that the process was distinctly conservative. Another one of IR’s stated aims was to remove utopian elements from liberal politics. According to Eric Goldman, ‘…liberalism gradually turned into a form of conservatism.’ (Cited by Drolet and Williams2)

    Militant Conservative Ideas Continue

    Militant conservative ideas continued to thrive, however, but not in the mainstream media. They were discussed in a ‘para-scholarly‘, sphere which enjoyed network connections with the political sphere. As a result, radical ideas have spread all over the globe.

    In IR’s defense, these thinkers were influenced by the structural reality of American politics. Both Morgenthau and Niebuhr argued that there was no social basis for an ‘authentic’ conservatism in America. And they were right. According to Morgenthau, the great majority of Americans

    have never known a status quo to which they could have been committed. For America has been committed to a purpose in the eyes of which each status quo has been but a stepping-stone to be left behind by another achievement. To ask America to defend a particular status quo, then, is tantamount to asking it for foreswear its purpose.

    Hans J. Morgenthau, The Purpose of American Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), pp. 296–7.

    But, as the RIS article illustrated, the radical Right has already come very close to foreswearing America’s purpose. This will be discussed in more detail in subsequent articles. The purpose of this article is to provide a global perspective on conventional conservatism.

    Conventional Conservatism

    I’ll begin with the view of conservatism supplied by the RIS article. According to Drolet and Williams 3, conservatism is not a cohesive school of thought. ‘…conservatism is a counter-movement’. It is a collection of ideas, attitudes, and thinkers that oppose historical liberal and socialist ideas. The only time conservative ideology is coherent in a given time and place is when it’s confronted by rival ideological structures. Conservatives are particularly wary of proposals put forward by anyone perceived to be of the Left.

    This seems to be how conservatism operates, although conservatives will probably object. The following summary is more neutral by comparison. It is taken from an article on Britannica.com.

    Western Europe

    Four great imperial dynasties fell in World War I: Russia, Austria-Hungary, Germany and Ottoman Turkey. Those dynasties had been the only remaining representatives of conservatism. Before the war, conservatism presumed monarchy, aristocracy and an established church. After the War, frustrated conservatives created parties to support nationalism in Germany, Italy, and other former allied countries. Then, beginning in the 1930s, the totalitarian Nazi regime either destroyed or coopted conservative parties in Central and Eastern Europe. (This will be explained in another article.)

    Conservative Ideology, Politics and Principles
    Dynasties of World War I Credit: Jelle Wesseling

    By 1946, socialism had been discredited in western Europe because of its inability to rebuild war-damaged economies. For this reason, many western Europeans returned to conservative politics. Of course, European conservatism no longer had aristocratic associations at this time. Conservative policies were attractive to voters because they promised economic growth, democratic freedoms, and the provision of social services by the state. For the rest of the twentieth century, European conservatism represented liberal individualism, social conscience, and opposition to communism.

    Great Britain

    The conservative party in Great Britain was very popular at the turn of the twentieth century. However, there was a Liberal interval. The Liberals were victorious in the general election of 1906, but they had already begun to lose trade union and working class supporters to the Labour Party. A Labour victory in 1924 ended the Liberal Party’s political relevance. For the next 40 years, conservatives formed the government. Their strength was largely the result of formerly Liberal, middle-class voters joining the Conservative Party. Today the Conservative Party in Great Britain is a union of Old Tory and Liberal interests combined against Labour.

    The Interwar Period in Great Britain

    British conservatism after World War I defended middle- and upper-class privileges and opposed socialism. During the 1930s, Conservatives followed a policy of appeasement ( a deal-making commercialist approach) with the Nazis. Appeasement failed and Britain entered the War.

    State welfare services were extended after 1945, under the Labour government and mixed economy of Clement Attlee. When Conservatives returned to power in 1951, they left most of these innovations in place. In fact, they claimed they could do a better job than labour in administering the welfare state. They even went so far as trying to outdo Labor’s programs of social spending and the encouragement of new home construction.

    This era of Liberal-Conservative accommodation ended with Margaret Thatcher. Thatcher’s conservatism stressed individual initiative, strident anti-communism, and laissez-faire economics. Her views had more in common with modern Libertarianism than the older conservatism of Burke. When she said, ‘there is no such thing as society‘ she repudiated the organic view of conventional conservatives.

    David Cameron (2010-16) and Theresa May (2016-19) had less extreme views of individualism. They brought back some of the communitarian elements of conventional conservatism.

    Continental Europe

    In western Europe, conservatism was represented by two or more parties ranging from the liberal center to the moderate and extreme right. There are three types of conservative party in western Europe: agrarian (particularly in Scandinavia), Christian Democratic, and the parties allied with big business. These categories are general and may include combinations of these ideologies.

    Italy

    The Christian Democratic parties have the longest history. They emerged in the 19th century to support the church and monarchy against liberal and radical elements. Since World War I the dominant element in this party has been supporters of business. In Italy, clerical interests remain strongly represented.

    The Christian Democratic Party has dominated governments in Italy since 1945. Since 1993, this has been under the name of the Italian Popular Party. The Christian Democratic Party was an alliance of moderate and conservative interest groups. It has formed a long series of government coalitions consisting of smaller centrist parties and the Italian Socialist Party. The Christian Democratic Party has never had a coherent policy and has been increasingly corrupt and politically ineffective, but it managed to exclude the large Italian Communist Party during the Cold War. The Italian Communist Party has been called the Democratic Party of the Left since 1991.

    After the collapse of the Soviet Union communism was no longer seen as a threat to Europe, so the Christian Democrats lost much of their support. This coincided with the growth of other conservative and nationalist groups that had formerly been outside of mainstream of Italian politics. These include the Northern League, which called for the creation of a federated Italian republic, and the National Alliance (which, until 1994, was the Italian Social Movement). Many regarded the National Alliance as neofascist. In 1994 a new conservative party was founded by the media tycoon Silvio Berlusconi. Berlusconi’s party is called Forza Italia (“Go, Italy!”).

    Germany

    Germany was divided between Roman Catholics and Protestants, so the role of the church in the conservative party was not as significant as in Italy. However, Germany’s political climate has been conservative since World War II. This is illustrated by the fact that the Social Democratic Party of Germany has progressively eliminated the socialist content of its program. They even embraced the profit motive in a party congress at Bad Godesberg in 1959.

    However, after 1950, the main Conservative Party, the Christian Democratic Union, adopted a program including support for a market economy and a strong commitment to maintaining and improving social insurance and other social welfare programs. 

    It was the Christian Democrats who presided over the unification of East and West Germany.

    From the 1990s, German conservative ideology has included minimal government, deregulation, privatization, and the reining-in of the welfare state. These policies have been difficult to implement, however. Many Germans continue to support an extensive safety net of unemployment insurance and other social welfare programs.

    France

    There was no Christian Democratic Party in France to represent moderate conservative opinion. Instead, a large number of French conservatives supported parties like Rally for the Republic. (Rally for the Republic was renamed ‘Union for a Popular Movement’ in 2002, and ‘the Republicans’ in 2015.) This party espoused a highly nationalistic conservatism based on the legacy of Charles de Gaulle, president of France from 1958 to 1969. French conservatives also supported anti-immigration groups such as the National Front, which was led until 2011 by Jean-Marie Le Pen and subsequently by his daughter, Marine Le Pen. The National Front, some argued, was not so much conservative as reactionary or neofascist. 

    Gaullist Conservatism

    Gaullist conservatism emphasized tradition and order and aimed at a politically united Europe under French leadership. Gaullists espoused divergent views on social issues, however. There are a large number of Gaullist and non-Gaullist conservative parties and it is difficult to categorized them. They lack stability and tend to identify themselves with local issues. 

    The Twenty-first Century

    In the early 21st century, French conservatives were united by a number of developments. One was the theme of “law and order.” Law and Order was promoted by interior minister (and later president) Nicolas Sarkozy. Unemployed youths in suburban Paris and elsewhere—many of whom were immigrants or the children of immigrants—engaged in periodic rioting to protest their plight, and were met with stiff (and popular) police resistance.

    The perceived threat to French values from immigrants, especially Muslims, also helped unite French conservatives. One of the values allegedly in danger was the conviction that public education should be strictly secular. When young Muslim women insisted on wearing veils to school, the French state reacted strongly. But this may have alienated Muslims from French society more than it reaffirmed French values.

    In general, conservatism in Europe has exerted a pervasive political influence since the start of the 20th century. However, it has found expression in parties of very different character. Parties have been characterized by an absence of ideology and often by the lack of any well-articulated political philosophy. They have espoused traditional middle-class values however. They have also opposed unnecessary state involvement in economic affairs, and radical attempts at income redistribution.

    Japan

    Japan has had conservative rule since the beginning of party politics in the 1880s. The only exception was the military government during the 1930s and 40s.

    Extensive social and political changes took place in Japan after the Meiji Restoration in 1868. Feudal institutions were abolished at this time, and western political institutions, such as constitutional government, were introduced. But in spite of these innovations, and the dislocations caused by rapid industrialization, politics continued to be shaped by traditional loyalties and attitudes.

    The Liberal-Democratic Party

    In 1955, the two most important conservative parties merged to form the Liberal-Democratic Party. Both parties had been dominated by personalities rather than by ideology and dogma. Subsequently, the allegiance of conservative members of the Diet was determined by personal loyalties to leaders of factions within the party, rather than commitment to policy. Today, an older Japan continues to influence the values, customs and relationships of Japanese conservatives.

    The Liberal-Democratic Party has been linked with big business. Its policies aim to foster a stable environment for the development of Japan’s market economy. To this end, the party has functioned primarily as a broker between conflicting business interests.

    Japanese Nationalism

    In the early twenty-first century, there was a resurgence of Japanese nationalism. Much of it was centered on how to teach the history of Japan in the 20th century—particularly the period before and during World War II. Conservative nationalists insisted that the Japanese military had done nothing wrong and had acted honorably. They claimed that stories of widespread war crimes were fabricated by Japan’s foreign and domestic enemies. It is not known how pervasive and influential this resurgent nationalism might be.

    The United States

    Conservatism changed in the United States in response to the New Deal. America’s identity as a liberal country changed as well.

    Conservative Ideology, Politics and Principles
    The New Deal Credit: Traveler1116
    The New Deal was Not a Liberal Policy

    After Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal, the perception of the United States as an inherently liberal country began to change. The New Deal was the economic relief program undertaken in 1933 to help raise the country out of the Great Depression. This program greatly expanded the federal government’s involvement in the economy through the regulation of private enterprise, the levying of higher taxes on corporations and the wealthy, and the expansion of social welfare programs.

    The Old Right

    The Republican Party, drawing on the support of big business, the wealthy, and prosperous farmers, stubbornly opposed the New Deal. While Democratic liberals moved to the left in endorsing a larger role for government, Republicans generally clung to a 19th-century version of liberalism that called for the government to avoid interfering in the market. These staunch conservatives were known as the Old Right. They were powerful enough to prevent the US from entering World War II until after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. However, their policy of fighting the New Deal did not help them at the polls.

    In the first decades after the war, the United States, like Britain, gradually expanded social services and increased government regulation of the economy. However, in the 1970s, the postwar economic growth that the United States and other Western countries had relied on to finance social welfare programs began to slacken. This took place just as Japan and other East Asian nations were finally attaining Western levels of prosperity. And unfortunately, liberal policies of governmental activism could not solve the problem. (This article is non-committal about the cause of US stagnation.)

    Neoconservatives

    At this point a new group of mainly American conservatives, the so-called neoconservatives, arose to argue that high levels of taxation and the government’s intrusive regulation of private enterprise were hampering economic growth. They also claimed that social welfare policies were leading those who received welfare benefits to become increasingly dependent upon government. The neoconservatives generally accepted a modest welfare state. They were sometimes described as disenchanted welfare liberals. But they insisted that social welfare programs should help people help themselves, not make them permanent wards of the state. In this and other respects neoconservatives saw themselves as defenders of middle-class virtues such as thrift, hard work, and self-restraint, all of which they took to be under attack in the cultural upheaval of the reputedly hedonistic 1960s.

    An Interventionist Stance

    The neoconservatives also took a keen interest in foreign affairs. They adopted an interventionist stance that set them apart from the isolationist tendencies of earlier conservatives. Many of them argued that the United States had both a right and a duty to intervene in the affairs of other nations in order to combat the influence of Soviet communism and to advance American interests; some even claimed that the United States had a duty to remake the non-Western world on the model of American democratic capitalism. Among American political leaders, the chief representatives of neoconservatism were the Republican presidents Ronald Reagan (1981–89) and George W. Bush (2001–09). Its most articulate advocates, however, were academics who entered politics, such as New York Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan and Jeane Kirkpatrick, who served as ambassador to the United Nations during the Reagan administration.

    During the Reagan era (the 1980s), more-traditional conservatives whose viewpoints harkened back to the Old Right remained resentful of neoconservatives for supposedly having co-opted and diluted American conservatism with a false brand of anticommunist “welfare statism.”

    Paleoconservatives Try to Take the Party Back

    The fall of the Berlin Wall (1989) and the collapse of the Soviet Union (1991) encouraged the “paleoconservatives,” as they were then identified by the conservative intellectuals Paul Gottfried and Thomas Fleming, to forcefully articulate their opposition to neoconservatism and to advocate new policies inspired by the Old Right’s ideological battles with New Deal Democrats.

    Neoconservatives Counter with Accusations of Anti-Semitism, Racism, Isolationism, and Zenophobia.

    Neoconservatives countered with long-standing accusations that the paleoconservative celebration of America’s Christian heritage and opposition to immigration from developing countries were indicative of the movement’s underlying anti-Semitism, racism, isolationism, and xenophobia.

    The influence of paleoconservatism within the American right arguably reached a high point at the end of the 20th century in Pat Buchanan’s unsuccessful attempts to secure the Republican presidential nomination in 1992 and 1996 and in his failed campaign for president as the nominee of the Reform Party in 2000.

    1. Drolet, J.-F., Williams, M. C. 2021. The radical Right, realism, and the politics of conservatism in postwar
      international thought. Review of International Studies 47, 273–293. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210521000103 ↩︎
    2. Ibid. p. 289 ↩︎
    3. Ibid, p. 275 ↩︎
  • Why No one Denies Anything to Netanyahu

    Why No One Denies Anything to Netanyahu
    Dolphin-class Submarine

    In a Neutrality Studies interview, Professor Dr. Dr. H.C. Wolfgang Streeck explains why no one denies anything to Netanyahu. They fear he might use nuclear weapons on his neighbors. This interview was based on an article Dr. Streeck wrote on this subject in December of 2023.

    If Streeck is correct, this explains President Biden’s unwavering support of Israel’s brutality during an election year. It also suggests why Biden’s support of Israel is not unique among American leaders, including Donald Trump. Nor is it unique to the United States. Aside from South Africa no government has done anything to stop Netanyahu.

    None of this is Biden’s fault. It’s not even the fault of the United States. That might sound strange. Lately, everything seems like the fault of the United States. But the most likely culprits have escaped notice. The United States did not create the overarching threat of nuclear weapons in Israeli hands. France was the first country to supply Israel with the ability to make nuclear weapons. Germany has contributed to Israel’s expansion and nuclear arsenal since World War II. The Israelis now have a ‘tripod’, which means submarines, missiles, and fighter jets. Their huge fleet of fighter planes is capable of going to Tehran and back without refueling, and while carrying a nuclear payload. And their Dolphin-class submarines are capable of being fitted with nuclear warheads.

    The nuclear arsenal of Israel is not just playing a part in the strategic decisions of Israel, but in the behavior of its neighbors. It is estimated that Israel has about 400 nuclear warheads of different kinds. By some estmates, Israel has the most technologically sophisticated nuclear arsenal, just behind or on par with the US.

    And it gets worse. The Israelis haven’t admitted they have nuclear weapons. This means there are no inspections and no formal nuclear policies. That’s serious enough, but when you consider that Israel’s neighbors in the the Middle East don’t have nuclear weapons at all, you begin to understand why Netanyahu feels so free to butcher the Palestinians. Israel’s neighbors in the Middle East offer no deterrence to Israel’s nuclear arsenal.

    How did this happen? France’s contribution took place before the Unite States entered the world stage. Germany’s contributions have been taking place since World War II. After the war the Germans were being supervised by the United States. However, they did some things on their own initiative.

    Streeck blames Germany’s courting of Israel on an absence of an identity, its dependence on the United States, and its pariah status. For these reasons, the Germans thought it was important to have some kind of good relations with Israel. After 1949, there was a conversation about reparations between Germany and Israel’s David Ben-Gurion. They discussed what Germany could do as compensation for the Holocaust. Ben-Gurion was quite clear that he needed support for expansion in Palestine, and Germany gave him that support. More recently, Germany has supplied Israel with six Dolphin-class submarines capable of being fitted with nuclear warheads. That’s how Streeck explains it anyway.

    I would put it this way: Germany made an alliance with Jews who happen to live in the most strategic location in the Middle East. Out of guilt. Never mind that every conqueror in the modern age has had designs on that place, incuding Hitler. But back to the interview.

    The fact that the Israeli government can pursue the strategy they are now pursuing has something to do with their confidence that if American public policy weakens US support, they have their own tools. So, there is a sort of intelligence feedback loop. The Americans are aware that if they don’t support Israeli policy in relation to Palestine, the Israelis will do it themselves. Then Israel might do things that are out of the control of the United States.

    I was worried before watching this interview by suggestions for electoral stategy in the US. There are journalists who say we can’t vote for Joe Biden because of his part in the genocide of Gaza. Some say outright that Trump is a better choice. It’s hard to explain these comments from reasonable people. We know that President Donald Trump helped Netanyahu’s reelection chances. He did this by recognizing Israel’s sovereignty over the Golan Heighs. Israel illegally seized the Golan Heights from Syria in 1967, and since then every American administration has considered it ‘occupied’ territory. But not Trump. Trump also moved the US embassy to Jerusalem against the wishes of the Palestinians. And, since October 7, candidate Trump has assured Israel of his support.

    I agree that the US should support Israel when it is attacked by Hamas, but electing an eratic character like Trump is not the solution. Trump is no more concerned about the Palestinians than Netanyahu.

    Another thing to consider is whether this attack on Gaza is part of a strategy to elect Trump. If Netanyahu prefers Trump to Biden, which I think he does, humiliating Biden would be a good way to help Trump. And if Streeck is right, there’s nothing Biden can do about it.

    If you’re waiting for my suggestion of who you should vote for, you may have missed the point of this article. I predict that Netanyahu will continue to pound the Palestinians until the election. And if that’s what he wants to do, no one will stop him.

  • American Interests in Ukraine

    I’m reading George Friedman’s “A Forecast for the 21st Century”. So far, it’s reinforced something I’ve read between the lines in analyses of past administrations.  The world’s governments don’t act irrationally.  Our current administration is no exception.  A 2012 article on stratfor.com helps to explain the U.S. behavior.  Perhaps it even explains Harper’s panel discussion on the EU in which representatives of the UK, the United States and France expressed concern about Germany’s power.  It certainly provides a different slant on so-called American imperialism. While America’s actions might appear as evidence of an offensive strategy, they are primarily defensive. U.S. foreign policy is the result of unheard-of power combined with fear.  I’m not qualified to answer the question of whether the level of fear is grounded in reality in any particular circumstance, but after reading this article, you can decide whether it is justified in the case of Ukraine.

    Largely due to the rise of competition with Russia’s role as supplier of Europe’s natural gas, Russia is trying to create strong buffers in Central and Eastern Europe.  She hasn’t been hugely successful, but her cause has been helped by decreasing military budgets in the EU.

    The wavering of NATO’s focus on Central Europe has added to NATO’s problems, for example in Afghanistan. In addition, France has supported military coalitions in places not strictly of interest to NATO, such as Libya.  

    For the past ten years, NATO has easily contained Russia militarily, while the EU contained her economically, but since the Greek economic crisis of 2010 the EU has had fewer resources.  Russia, on the other hand, has a $600 billion surplus from energy sales and $500 billion in reserves.  

    By 2012, the Russians had increased their troop presence near Estonia.  They had an agreement with Belarus to deploy troops there in a wartime scenario, and they had deployed S-400 anti-aircraft missile systems in Kaliningrad. They also had plans to deploy the Iskander missile system there.  

    Russia has also been buying assets at the end of the energy supply chain in Europe, which will give it more leverage in the foreign policies of European states.  In this case however, Russia is in need of European investment, which will increase EU leverage over Russia. 

    These facts provide some of the background for Russia’s current involvement in Ukraine, which is tremendously important to her strategic plans.  Russian influence in Ukraine would integrate Russia into Europe, but it would also allow Russia to truly challenge Europe.  

    In view of Germany’s rising power in the EU, this writer believes–or he did in 2012–that a German-Russian condominium is a possibility.  Germany has always been conflicted between Atlantic Europe to the West and land-bound, autocratic Europe to the East.  A subtle turn by Germany toward Moscow would be a serious matter.  

    Europe is very much in play. Its future as an economic, political and moral powerhouse is not written in advance — as was smugly assumed a few years ago. The EU debt crisis is only the beginning of the story, with geopolitical aftershocks that will only become apparent over time.[ref]Global Affairs, Stratfor.com, May 23, 2012. Available: http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/europes-russia-factor#ixzz2vCJdWzhd[/ref]

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