Tag: ideology

  • Misogyny is Part of a Complex Ideology

    Reading Time: 7 minutes

    Often misogyny is part of a complex ideology. But it’s not clear which came first–the misogyny or the supporting ideology. For committed misogynists, hatred is a preference. Francis Parker Yockey and Baron Julius Evola were both misogynists. Kevin Coogan attributes this in large part to occult influences. The most prominent source of far right occult beliefs in the postwar period was Theosophy.

    Helena Petrovna Blavatsky

    Among Yockey’s possessions when the FBI arrested him was a citation for the June 1937 issue of The Theosophical Forum, an American journal of the Theosophy Society. The Russian-born mystic, Helena Petrovna Blavatsky founded the Theosophical society in New York City in 1875. In 1888, she published her book, The Secret Doctrine. Blavatsky’s doctrine basically turned the evolutionary worldview on its head. However, she had no intention of replacing evolution with biblical creationism. Her work resulted in countless forms and expressions of mischief.

    Root Races

    According to Blavatsky, the world has seen the rise and fall of seven “Root Races”. This rise and fall has taken place many times over. Now (in Blavatsky’s time) the Aryan, or fifth Root Race, dominates the world. However, the Aryans are at the end of a karmic cycle.

    Blavatsky taught that the Kali-Yuga was a time of great destruction. But its end was coming. This meant the beginning of the new Sixth Root Race. And the Sixth Root Race would begin the ascendancy of man toward the highest, Seventh Root Race of god-men.

    Curiously, Blavatsky’s Root Races were not biological entities. They were psychic entities. But in spite of this, her arguments were very influential for the racist right in both Germany and Austria. They ‘proved’ the Aryans were distant spiritual descendants of the highest root race, descended from the degenerate Atlantean tribes who themselves descended from the original god-men.

    Traditionalism vs Evolutionism

    The subterranean world of the high occult enveloped Yockey. Thanks to his occult interests, he saw himself as part of an underground elite, a secret new race of god-men. He wrote extensively about polarity and he developed sado-masochistic inclinations. To understand him, it is necessary to examine the writings of Julius Evola, the most important and most influential fascist high-occultist in postwar Europe.

    In his book, Revolt Against the Modern World. Evola argued that every epoch has its own myth. Democratic evolutionism is the Kali-Yuga’s myth. The myth of the new age, however, will be the Traditional worldview.

    Tradition teaches that mankind did not come from lower forms. It has higher origins. The lower represents a degeneration from the higher. Like Blavatsky, Evola claimed that today’s Aryans are the spiritual descendants of the highest root race. This highest root race was a ‘divine’ race. But it mixed its seed with the inferior human race, and so it is no longer with us.1

    Tradition, in more recent eras, developed a variety of myths referring to races as bearers of civilization and to the struggles between divine races and animal, cyclopic, or demonic races. They are the Aesir against the Elementarwesen; the Olympians and the heroes against giants and monsters of the darkness, the water, and the earth. They are the Aryan deva fighting against the asura, the enemies of the divine heroes; they are the Incas, the dominators who impose their solar laws on the aborigines who worshipped ‘Mother Earth’.

    Julius Evola, as quoted by Kevin Coogan p. 304

    As mentioned in a previous article, Evola was an early critic of Yockey’s Imperium. However, he merely thought Yockey was unrealistic about the timeframe of the fascist takeover. Evola and Yockey agreed on their basic ideology.

    René Guénon

    René Guénon was also an important figure in the European occult underground. Evola and Guénon had a disagreement about man’s relationship to the gods, however Guénon’s Traditionalism remained important within the European far right. And although Guénon eventually converted to Islam, he remained close to ‘traditionalist’ elements of the Catholic Church.

    Guénon taught that the modern age’s interest in democracy, mass culture, and materialism are all manifestations of the Kali-Yuga. The Kali-Yuga has infected thinking to the point where Western philosophy is purely human in character. Now philosophy is merely part of the rational order, which is inferior.

    The ideal order is a sort of genuine supra-rational and non-human traditional wisdom. Humans can’t achieve this kind of wisdom because ‘Truth’ is not a product of the human mind. It exists independently of ourselves. All we can do is apprehend it (Coogan, p. 294).

    Evola embraced this argument completely. He shared Guénon’s hatred of ‘mere human logos’. He believed that all the Renaissance had accomplished was to usher in the exaltation of the individual. Greece’s true zenith was not in the time of Socrates. It was during the mythical Heroic Age of Heracles.

    Traditionalism and the Un-human Ideal

    A human-like ‘personal God’ did not rule Evola’s universe. It was ruled by a numen. He defined a numen as an immutable naked force, an essence free of passion and change, one which creates distance with regard to everything which is merely human, a solar realm of Olympic peace and light, of divine regality. Borrowing from Guénon, he claimed this vision of pure being, the Hindu Satya-Yuga, corresponded in the West to Hesiod’s Golden Age.

    Like Spengler, he believed fascism was valuable only because it would bring on the dissolution of the old world in the Kali-Yuga. The old world’s destruction was necessary in order for the new age to arise. For Evola, fascism was merely a political form of Dada.

    Coogan on The Hermetic Tradition

    To help his readers understand Evola’s argument about God, Coogan examines Evola’s 1931 book The Hermetic Tradition. He reports that when Avaloka, a journal devoted to Hermetic thought, published a review from a section of Evola’s book, The Tree, the Serpent, and the Titan, the journal’s editor, Arthur Versluis, warned his readers that there is something Promethean, if not Luciferian, in Evola’s perspective. Coogan agrees (Coogan p. 296).

    The World Tree

    According to Evola’s ideology, the tree is an axis mundi joining two worlds: the solar world of immortality and timeless knowledge (Being) and the telluric world of Mother Earth (Becoming). This view associates Becoming with women, earth, and chaos symbols like dragons.

    In his book, Evola examines the dual symbolism of the Tree, namely its identification with notions of immortality and supernatural knowledge as well as its association with fatal and destructive forces like dragons, serpents, and demons. But of course Evola is talking about the World Tree. Coogan identifies three famous trees representing universal force. They are the Tree of the World, and the two biblical trees: the tree of life and the tree of knowledge. Each of them symbolizes the universal force linked to supernatural knowledge, immortality, and the power of domination. This universal force has a feminine nature.

    Misogyny is based on a complex ideology
    The Idea of a Danger. Credit: George Cotayo

    A Danger or a Promise?

    These trees also contain the idea of a danger. On the one hand, the tree symbolizes a temptation which brings ruin and damnation upon the one who succumbs to it. But it is also the object of conquest which transforms he who dares to undertake it into a God. It might even transfer the attributes of divinity and immortality from one race of beings to another.

    Adam tried to eat from the Tree of Knowledge and become godlike. He failed. But according to some legends, others have succeeded. These include the Hindu god Indra, Odin, Mithras, and Heracles. The legends tell us

    …of an undertaking which involved risk and a fundamental uncertainty. In Hesiod’s Theogony, and typically in the legend of the king of the Woods, Gods or exceptional men are seen as taking possession of power which can pass, along with the attributes of divinity, to whoever knows how to seize it…But among those who make the attempt, some force a way and triumph, and others fall, paying for their daring, experiencing the fatal effects of that same [primordial female] power.

    Julius Evola, as quoted by Coogan, p. 297

    Coogan objects to Evola’s presentation of this drama. He thinks the real question is whether man should even attempt to rival the gods. In mythology there are only two answers to this question, and they are in opposition to each other. They are the ‘magico-heroic’ answer and the religious answer.

    According to the magico-heroic view, he who attempts to become one with the gods but fails, is simply a being whose fortitude and good fortune were not equal to his daring. In the religious interpretation, however, such misfortune is changed to guilt, the heroic attempt [is changed] to a sacrilegious and cursed act not because of its failure, but in itself.

    Coogan, p. 297

    Adam

    Misogyny is Part of a Complex Ideology
    What happened to Adam is the only thing that could have happened to him. Credit: Grafissimo

    Coogan argues that what happens to Adam is the only thing that could have happened to him. Adam becomes one who has sinned. He has no alternative, therefore, but to seek expiation, and above all to renounce the wish which led him to that undertaking. The idea that the conquered can still think of reconquest, or intend to hold firm to the dignity which his act has earned him, appears from the religious perspective as ‘the most reprehensible Luciferism’ (Coogan p. 298). Yet, the heroic viewpoint persists.

    Hermes

    The Hermetic tradition represents the heroic viewpoint. Hermes is not only the messenger of the Gods; he is also one who succeeds. He takes from Zeus his scepter, from Venus her belt, and from Vulcan, the tools of his allegorical craft. In Egyptian tradition, Hermes became Hermes Trismegistus. He is the figure of one of the Kings and masters of the primordial age who gave man the principles of a higher civilization.

    The Fallen Angels

    Fallen Angels
    From Their Union Sprang the Nephilim or Watchers. Credit: francescoch

    We also have the account of fallen angels in the Book of Enoch. Coogan argues that it wasn’t merely their desire for the women that caused their downfall. There is power in woman’s relationship with the Tree, and power is what the angels were really after. When the angels became united to power, they fell and came to earth. They alighted on a high place of the earth (Mount Hermon), and from their union with the women sprang the Nephilim or Watchers. The Watchers teach the Royal Hermetic Art by which man can control the Gods.

    Evola updated and reissued The Hermetic Tradition in 1948. This was three years after the defeat of the ‘Heroes’ in World War II. For Evola, losing the war was not a metaphysical punishment. It was a simple defeat. He never stopped pursuing the quest for power/knowledge, for immortality, for domination over the Tree/Female. The Hermetic Tradition is a vision of a new race of men/gods.

    What Guénon and Evola Had in Common

    According to Coogan, Guénon was different than Evola. He thought Catholicism was the only tradition that could provide the ruling mythos for Europe (p. 300). But I think Coogan gives Guénon too much credit. In Guenon’s scheme, the elite will rule the world using primordial teachings found in several distinct traditions. But that is a discussion for another time.

    1. Kevin Coogan, Dreamer of the Day: Francis Parker Yockey and the Postwar Fascist International, Autonomedia, Brooklyn, New York, 1999, pp. 291-292 ↩︎

  • Conservative Ideology Politics & Principles

    Reading Time: 11 minutes

    The previous article focused on militant conservatism. But it didn’t go into detail on various types of conservatism, or on the characteristics of conventional conservatism. Nor did it explain how the character of conservatism varies from one nation to another. 21st century progressives are in the process of developing an international outlook, so awareness of ideological and organizational differences is crucial. The concept of conservatism is central to these differences. This article is a review of conservative ideology, politics and principles.

    Summary of the Discussion So Far

    To summarize the discussion so far, after the end of World War II, social scientists in the United States feared militant anti-communism and its negative influence on the civil rights movement and other campaigns. They believed anti-communist and anti-liberal ideas threatened peace and democracy. Many thinkers in the field of International Relations (IR) tried to create a stronger liberalism as part of their strategy. They believed they could accomplish this by borrowing conservative ‘insights’. The fusion of liberalism and the radical Right was called ‘realism’. Another name for realism is conservative liberalism. Postwar American International Relations developed in this context.

    Considering this history, it is not surprising that conventional conservatism has faded into the background. Or maybe it would be more correct to say that conventional conservatism turned into realistic liberalism in the context of International Relations. The same thing happened to liberalism.

    Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. and Reinhold Niebuhr

    Thinkers such as Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. and Reinhold Niebuhr began to reformulate liberalism in a way that muted the radical, progressivist, egalitarian and utopian premises of the Progressive Era, and to talk about ‘original sin’, the inherent irrationality of human nature, and the limitations of political solutions to intractable problems of the human condition.1 At the same time, they denied that the process was distinctly conservative. Another one of IR’s stated aims was to remove utopian elements from liberal politics. According to Eric Goldman, ‘…liberalism gradually turned into a form of conservatism.’ (Cited by Drolet and Williams2)

    Militant Conservative Ideas Continue

    Militant conservative ideas continued to thrive, however, but not in the mainstream media. They were discussed in a ‘para-scholarly‘, sphere which enjoyed network connections with the political sphere. As a result, radical ideas have spread all over the globe.

    In IR’s defense, these thinkers were influenced by the structural reality of American politics. Both Morgenthau and Niebuhr argued that there was no social basis for an ‘authentic’ conservatism in America. And they were right. According to Morgenthau, the great majority of Americans

    have never known a status quo to which they could have been committed. For America has been committed to a purpose in the eyes of which each status quo has been but a stepping-stone to be left behind by another achievement. To ask America to defend a particular status quo, then, is tantamount to asking it for foreswear its purpose.

    Hans J. Morgenthau, The Purpose of American Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), pp. 296–7.

    But, as the RIS article illustrated, the radical Right has already come very close to foreswearing America’s purpose. This will be discussed in more detail in subsequent articles. The purpose of this article is to provide a global perspective on conventional conservatism.

    Conventional Conservatism

    I’ll begin with the view of conservatism supplied by the RIS article. According to Drolet and Williams 3, conservatism is not a cohesive school of thought. ‘…conservatism is a counter-movement’. It is a collection of ideas, attitudes, and thinkers that oppose historical liberal and socialist ideas. The only time conservative ideology is coherent in a given time and place is when it’s confronted by rival ideological structures. Conservatives are particularly wary of proposals put forward by anyone perceived to be of the Left.

    This seems to be how conservatism operates, although conservatives will probably object. The following summary is more neutral by comparison. It is taken from an article on Britannica.com.

    Western Europe

    Four great imperial dynasties fell in World War I: Russia, Austria-Hungary, Germany and Ottoman Turkey. Those dynasties had been the only remaining representatives of conservatism. Before the war, conservatism presumed monarchy, aristocracy and an established church. After the War, frustrated conservatives created parties to support nationalism in Germany, Italy, and other former allied countries. Then, beginning in the 1930s, the totalitarian Nazi regime either destroyed or coopted conservative parties in Central and Eastern Europe. (This will be explained in another article.)

    Conservative Ideology, Politics and Principles
    Dynasties of World War I Credit: Jelle Wesseling

    By 1946, socialism had been discredited in western Europe because of its inability to rebuild war-damaged economies. For this reason, many western Europeans returned to conservative politics. Of course, European conservatism no longer had aristocratic associations at this time. Conservative policies were attractive to voters because they promised economic growth, democratic freedoms, and the provision of social services by the state. For the rest of the twentieth century, European conservatism represented liberal individualism, social conscience, and opposition to communism.

    Great Britain

    The conservative party in Great Britain was very popular at the turn of the twentieth century. However, there was a Liberal interval. The Liberals were victorious in the general election of 1906, but they had already begun to lose trade union and working class supporters to the Labour Party. A Labour victory in 1924 ended the Liberal Party’s political relevance. For the next 40 years, conservatives formed the government. Their strength was largely the result of formerly Liberal, middle-class voters joining the Conservative Party. Today the Conservative Party in Great Britain is a union of Old Tory and Liberal interests combined against Labour.

    The Interwar Period in Great Britain

    British conservatism after World War I defended middle- and upper-class privileges and opposed socialism. During the 1930s, Conservatives followed a policy of appeasement ( a deal-making commercialist approach) with the Nazis. Appeasement failed and Britain entered the War.

    State welfare services were extended after 1945, under the Labour government and mixed economy of Clement Attlee. When Conservatives returned to power in 1951, they left most of these innovations in place. In fact, they claimed they could do a better job than labour in administering the welfare state. They even went so far as trying to outdo Labor’s programs of social spending and the encouragement of new home construction.

    This era of Liberal-Conservative accommodation ended with Margaret Thatcher. Thatcher’s conservatism stressed individual initiative, strident anti-communism, and laissez-faire economics. Her views had more in common with modern Libertarianism than the older conservatism of Burke. When she said, ‘there is no such thing as society‘ she repudiated the organic view of conventional conservatives.

    David Cameron (2010-16) and Theresa May (2016-19) had less extreme views of individualism. They brought back some of the communitarian elements of conventional conservatism.

    Continental Europe

    In western Europe, conservatism was represented by two or more parties ranging from the liberal center to the moderate and extreme right. There are three types of conservative party in western Europe: agrarian (particularly in Scandinavia), Christian Democratic, and the parties allied with big business. These categories are general and may include combinations of these ideologies.

    Italy

    The Christian Democratic parties have the longest history. They emerged in the 19th century to support the church and monarchy against liberal and radical elements. Since World War I the dominant element in this party has been supporters of business. In Italy, clerical interests remain strongly represented.

    The Christian Democratic Party has dominated governments in Italy since 1945. Since 1993, this has been under the name of the Italian Popular Party. The Christian Democratic Party was an alliance of moderate and conservative interest groups. It has formed a long series of government coalitions consisting of smaller centrist parties and the Italian Socialist Party. The Christian Democratic Party has never had a coherent policy and has been increasingly corrupt and politically ineffective, but it managed to exclude the large Italian Communist Party during the Cold War. The Italian Communist Party has been called the Democratic Party of the Left since 1991.

    After the collapse of the Soviet Union communism was no longer seen as a threat to Europe, so the Christian Democrats lost much of their support. This coincided with the growth of other conservative and nationalist groups that had formerly been outside of mainstream of Italian politics. These include the Northern League, which called for the creation of a federated Italian republic, and the National Alliance (which, until 1994, was the Italian Social Movement). Many regarded the National Alliance as neofascist. In 1994 a new conservative party was founded by the media tycoon Silvio Berlusconi. Berlusconi’s party is called Forza Italia (“Go, Italy!”).

    Germany

    Germany was divided between Roman Catholics and Protestants, so the role of the church in the conservative party was not as significant as in Italy. However, Germany’s political climate has been conservative since World War II. This is illustrated by the fact that the Social Democratic Party of Germany has progressively eliminated the socialist content of its program. They even embraced the profit motive in a party congress at Bad Godesberg in 1959.

    However, after 1950, the main Conservative Party, the Christian Democratic Union, adopted a program including support for a market economy and a strong commitment to maintaining and improving social insurance and other social welfare programs. 

    It was the Christian Democrats who presided over the unification of East and West Germany.

    From the 1990s, German conservative ideology has included minimal government, deregulation, privatization, and the reining-in of the welfare state. These policies have been difficult to implement, however. Many Germans continue to support an extensive safety net of unemployment insurance and other social welfare programs.

    France

    There was no Christian Democratic Party in France to represent moderate conservative opinion. Instead, a large number of French conservatives supported parties like Rally for the Republic. (Rally for the Republic was renamed ‘Union for a Popular Movement’ in 2002, and ‘the Republicans’ in 2015.) This party espoused a highly nationalistic conservatism based on the legacy of Charles de Gaulle, president of France from 1958 to 1969. French conservatives also supported anti-immigration groups such as the National Front, which was led until 2011 by Jean-Marie Le Pen and subsequently by his daughter, Marine Le Pen. The National Front, some argued, was not so much conservative as reactionary or neofascist. 

    Gaullist Conservatism

    Gaullist conservatism emphasized tradition and order and aimed at a politically united Europe under French leadership. Gaullists espoused divergent views on social issues, however. There are a large number of Gaullist and non-Gaullist conservative parties and it is difficult to categorized them. They lack stability and tend to identify themselves with local issues. 

    The Twenty-first Century

    In the early 21st century, French conservatives were united by a number of developments. One was the theme of “law and order.” Law and Order was promoted by interior minister (and later president) Nicolas Sarkozy. Unemployed youths in suburban Paris and elsewhere—many of whom were immigrants or the children of immigrants—engaged in periodic rioting to protest their plight, and were met with stiff (and popular) police resistance.

    The perceived threat to French values from immigrants, especially Muslims, also helped unite French conservatives. One of the values allegedly in danger was the conviction that public education should be strictly secular. When young Muslim women insisted on wearing veils to school, the French state reacted strongly. But this may have alienated Muslims from French society more than it reaffirmed French values.

    In general, conservatism in Europe has exerted a pervasive political influence since the start of the 20th century. However, it has found expression in parties of very different character. Parties have been characterized by an absence of ideology and often by the lack of any well-articulated political philosophy. They have espoused traditional middle-class values however. They have also opposed unnecessary state involvement in economic affairs, and radical attempts at income redistribution.

    Japan

    Japan has had conservative rule since the beginning of party politics in the 1880s. The only exception was the military government during the 1930s and 40s.

    Extensive social and political changes took place in Japan after the Meiji Restoration in 1868. Feudal institutions were abolished at this time, and western political institutions, such as constitutional government, were introduced. But in spite of these innovations, and the dislocations caused by rapid industrialization, politics continued to be shaped by traditional loyalties and attitudes.

    The Liberal-Democratic Party

    In 1955, the two most important conservative parties merged to form the Liberal-Democratic Party. Both parties had been dominated by personalities rather than by ideology and dogma. Subsequently, the allegiance of conservative members of the Diet was determined by personal loyalties to leaders of factions within the party, rather than commitment to policy. Today, an older Japan continues to influence the values, customs and relationships of Japanese conservatives.

    The Liberal-Democratic Party has been linked with big business. Its policies aim to foster a stable environment for the development of Japan’s market economy. To this end, the party has functioned primarily as a broker between conflicting business interests.

    Japanese Nationalism

    In the early twenty-first century, there was a resurgence of Japanese nationalism. Much of it was centered on how to teach the history of Japan in the 20th century—particularly the period before and during World War II. Conservative nationalists insisted that the Japanese military had done nothing wrong and had acted honorably. They claimed that stories of widespread war crimes were fabricated by Japan’s foreign and domestic enemies. It is not known how pervasive and influential this resurgent nationalism might be.

    The United States

    Conservatism changed in the United States in response to the New Deal. America’s identity as a liberal country changed as well.

    Conservative Ideology, Politics and Principles
    The New Deal Credit: Traveler1116
    The New Deal was Not a Liberal Policy

    After Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal, the perception of the United States as an inherently liberal country began to change. The New Deal was the economic relief program undertaken in 1933 to help raise the country out of the Great Depression. This program greatly expanded the federal government’s involvement in the economy through the regulation of private enterprise, the levying of higher taxes on corporations and the wealthy, and the expansion of social welfare programs.

    The Old Right

    The Republican Party, drawing on the support of big business, the wealthy, and prosperous farmers, stubbornly opposed the New Deal. While Democratic liberals moved to the left in endorsing a larger role for government, Republicans generally clung to a 19th-century version of liberalism that called for the government to avoid interfering in the market. These staunch conservatives were known as the Old Right. They were powerful enough to prevent the US from entering World War II until after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. However, their policy of fighting the New Deal did not help them at the polls.

    In the first decades after the war, the United States, like Britain, gradually expanded social services and increased government regulation of the economy. However, in the 1970s, the postwar economic growth that the United States and other Western countries had relied on to finance social welfare programs began to slacken. This took place just as Japan and other East Asian nations were finally attaining Western levels of prosperity. And unfortunately, liberal policies of governmental activism could not solve the problem. (This article is non-committal about the cause of US stagnation.)

    Neoconservatives

    At this point a new group of mainly American conservatives, the so-called neoconservatives, arose to argue that high levels of taxation and the government’s intrusive regulation of private enterprise were hampering economic growth. They also claimed that social welfare policies were leading those who received welfare benefits to become increasingly dependent upon government. The neoconservatives generally accepted a modest welfare state. They were sometimes described as disenchanted welfare liberals. But they insisted that social welfare programs should help people help themselves, not make them permanent wards of the state. In this and other respects neoconservatives saw themselves as defenders of middle-class virtues such as thrift, hard work, and self-restraint, all of which they took to be under attack in the cultural upheaval of the reputedly hedonistic 1960s.

    An Interventionist Stance

    The neoconservatives also took a keen interest in foreign affairs. They adopted an interventionist stance that set them apart from the isolationist tendencies of earlier conservatives. Many of them argued that the United States had both a right and a duty to intervene in the affairs of other nations in order to combat the influence of Soviet communism and to advance American interests; some even claimed that the United States had a duty to remake the non-Western world on the model of American democratic capitalism. Among American political leaders, the chief representatives of neoconservatism were the Republican presidents Ronald Reagan (1981–89) and George W. Bush (2001–09). Its most articulate advocates, however, were academics who entered politics, such as New York Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan and Jeane Kirkpatrick, who served as ambassador to the United Nations during the Reagan administration.

    During the Reagan era (the 1980s), more-traditional conservatives whose viewpoints harkened back to the Old Right remained resentful of neoconservatives for supposedly having co-opted and diluted American conservatism with a false brand of anticommunist “welfare statism.”

    Paleoconservatives Try to Take the Party Back

    The fall of the Berlin Wall (1989) and the collapse of the Soviet Union (1991) encouraged the “paleoconservatives,” as they were then identified by the conservative intellectuals Paul Gottfried and Thomas Fleming, to forcefully articulate their opposition to neoconservatism and to advocate new policies inspired by the Old Right’s ideological battles with New Deal Democrats.

    Neoconservatives Counter with Accusations of Anti-Semitism, Racism, Isolationism, and Zenophobia.

    Neoconservatives countered with long-standing accusations that the paleoconservative celebration of America’s Christian heritage and opposition to immigration from developing countries were indicative of the movement’s underlying anti-Semitism, racism, isolationism, and xenophobia.

    The influence of paleoconservatism within the American right arguably reached a high point at the end of the 20th century in Pat Buchanan’s unsuccessful attempts to secure the Republican presidential nomination in 1992 and 1996 and in his failed campaign for president as the nominee of the Reform Party in 2000.

    1. Drolet, J.-F., Williams, M. C. 2021. The radical Right, realism, and the politics of conservatism in postwar
      international thought. Review of International Studies 47, 273–293. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210521000103 ↩︎
    2. Ibid. p. 289 ↩︎
    3. Ibid, p. 275 ↩︎
  • Gender Rights are a Litmus Test for Left-ness

    Reading Time: 2 minutesAside from the climate crisis there is general agreement that individuals on the left don’t have to share the same religious beliefs or ideology. However, that belief is misleading. A focus on Gender rights seems to be an ideological requirement. The issue of Gender rights has become a litmus test for left-ness. A realistic analysis of our allies and our opposition suggests this ideology acts as a handicap for political success.

    A Focus on Gender Rights Alienates Important Allies

    The climate crisis is rightly a major focus for the political left. Due to time constraints and the ongoing attacks on the democratic process, there are natural limits to additional issues that can be effectively addressed. These limits have to do with our indigenous allies in the fight against climate change and their consensus, or lack thereof, on our political patform.

    No one seems concerned that our allies among the Native Americans believe there are only two genders, male and female. This lack of concern is surprising, considering that globally, indigenous people are the foundation of our fight against climate change. We’ve asked them to teach us to care for the land and they’ve indicated that they’re willing to do so, but how teachable are we if we blithely carry the gender rights banner at the front of the parade?

    Would the Left Benefit From a Narrower Focus?

    In my opinion, individuals on the left have some important questions to answer. What are we trying to accomplish? Are we trying to address a threat to the human race, or are we establishing leftist credentials? Do we behave as friends to our allies, or competing ideologues? Do we fit the Right’s definition of the ‘radical woke’ left, or are we clear-headed strategists? I would argue that if you don’t think these are important questions, either you are not serious, or you don’t understand our opposition.

    Gender Ideology is an Easy Target for the Right

    Ideologues on the right have made their opposition to gender ideology a major part of their platform, and they are unified against this issue. They also deny the danger of global warming. So, in the minds of undecided voters, denial of global warming has become inseparable from a conservative position on gender. In this scenario, the left’s focus on gender ideology is the opposite of strategic. It is a handicap.

  • Plato’s Iron Fist in the Soviet Union

    Reading Time: 3 minutesI’ve been saying that we need to reexamine the influence of the ideas of Plato and Aristotle in politics and religion. As it happens, that conversation is already underway. The following discussion is based on an article about Plato’s influence in Russia. Those who like to divide Russian and Western thought may be shocked to discover Plato’s Iron Fist in the Soviet Union.  Mikhail Epstein, Professor of Russian and Cultural Theory and Co-Director of the Center for Humanities Innovation, identifies the Russian approach to Plato as the source of totalitarianism in the Soviet Union. However, the Russian experience has as much meaning for the West as it does for Russia.

    In this article I will demonstrate that both Marxist and non-Marxist ideologies are influenced by Plato’s authoritarian tendencies.

    What is Philosophy?

    Epstein begins by asking, What is philosophy? He answers by saying that although there is no simple, universal definition, the most ‘credible attempt is a nominalistic reference: philosophy is what Plato and Aristotle, Kant and Hegel were occupied with.’ Then he provides what he calls the most broadly cited definition, that of A. Whitehead: ‘philosophy is a series of footnotes to Plato.’1

    Plato's Iron Fist in the Soviet Union
    Immanuel Kant

    Russian Philosophy is Part of the Western Intellectual Tradition

    If this is accepted, he argues, Russian philosophy must be seen as a part of the Western intellectual tradition. Russia, and especially the Soviet Union, has been unique in its literal incarnation of the teachings of Plato. This was made possible by the tendency of Russian thought to ‘philosophize reality, to transform it into a transparent kingdom of ideas.’ In the Soviet Union, this resulted in philosophy becoming a supreme legal and political institution, and ‘in its unrestricted dominion [it] was equivalent to madness.’ However, non-Marxist and anti-Marxist thinkers in Russia belong to the same tradition. The hard-won understanding they achieved in this process can provide an invaluable lesson for the West.

    Non-Marxist and Anti-Marxist thinkers in Russia also Belong to the Platonic Tradition

    “One might even say that the philosophy of the Soviet epoch is the final stage of the development and embodiment of Plato’s ideas in the Western world. During this stage, the project of ideocracy came to a complete realization and exhausted itself. The czardom of ideas arrived at the threshold of self-destruction because the substance of Being resisted the yoke of idealism, and it is now in the process of returning to its primordial identity. Thus Russian philosophy both summarizes and punctuates more than two thousand years of the Platonic tradition and points the way for a return to foundations which are not susceptible to ideologic perversions.

    “A relatively short period of years sums up a two-millenium adventure of Western thought which escorted Plato in his search for the world of pure ideas. Among these footnotes to Plato, Russian philosophy appears to the attentive eye as the final entry, signifying ‘The End’.”

    Is the Problem Confined to One Particular Approach to Plato?

    Still, I suppose someone could argue that the problem is not Plato, but one particular approach to Plato. Epstein mentions this as a possibility, but says the question has yet to be answered.

    “The question is: Now that Platonism in its Marxist guise, has been overcome by Russian thought, is it still possible to find inspiration in Platonism as such, in its sublime idealistic and religious interpretations? Or does the experience of Russian history convincingly argue that Platonism has exhausted itself as a spiritual resource for humanity and that all attempts to Christianize it are just wishful illusions? (Russia slipped into the pagan version of Platonism, while in the West, Plato’s ideas were Christianized.)

    “Whatever the answer may be, it is indisputable that the ongoing relevance of Platonism for Russian thought will provide the ground for its intensive dialogue with…Western philosophy also rooted in Plato’s heritage.”2

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